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 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 From 2008 to 2010, cyber criminals (allegedly from Russia) three times hacked 
into Wyndham Hotel and Resorts LLC’s (“WHR’s”) computer network and the 
separate networks maintained by several independently owned hotels licensed to use the 
“Wyndham Hotels” brand.  In response to these crimes, WHR alerted authorities, 
retained computer forensic experts, and implemented significant remedial measures.  To 
WHR’s knowledge, these criminals were never apprehended by authorities and no hotel 
guest suffered financial injury as a result of these crimes.  Notwithstanding that WHR 
was a victim of hacking, the FTC has singled out WHR in this unprecedented litigation, 
claiming that WHR’s cybersecurity practices are “unfair” and “unreasonable.” 
 Hacking is an endemic problem.  Media stories routinely appear about cyber 
attacks on private companies, including Google, Citibank, Microsoft, Sony, and many 
others, as well as government entities such as the CIA, DOD, NASA, FBI, and the FTC 
itself.   To address pressing concerns of cybersecurity, Congress and the White House 
have made substantial efforts to enact various comprehensive cybersecurity laws—
including the Cybersecurity Act of 2012—that would establish specific data-security 
standards for the private sector.  The most recent efforts included a robust debate 
among the President, legislators, interest groups, and other stakeholders about the law’s 
proper scope and the potential costs it could impose on private businesses.  While the 
Cybersecurity Act failed to pass the Senate in August 2012, the White House has 
announced that it may issue an Executive Order addressing cybersecurity.   
 The FTC has not waited for Congress or the President.  Instead of allowing the 
political process to settle the debate over the costs and benefits of cybersecurity policy, 
the FTC filed this action under Section 5 of the FTC Act, which forbids “unfair or 
deceptive” trade practices.   WHR does not dispute that the FTC can bring enforcement 
actions against companies that make “deceptive” statements to consumers.  But the 
Commission is attempting to do much more than that in this case.  Relying on Section 
5’s prohibition on “unfair” trade practices—which has traditionally been read to 
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 2  
prohibit certain unconscionable or oppressive acts toward consumers—the FTC 
assumes that it has the statutory authority to do that which Congress has refused: 
establish data-security standards for the private sector and enforce those standards in 
federal court.  But the FTC previously disclaimed the very authority it purports to wield 
here.  In a report issued in 2000, the FTC acknowledged that it lacked authority to 
require firms to adopt specific data-security practices, and it asked Congress for 
legislation that would grant it that authority.  See infra at 6-7.  Although Congress never 
responded to that request, the FTC “decided to move forward on its own without any 
new, specific privacy laws or delegation of authority from Congress.”  M. Scott, The 
FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has The 
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 Admin. L. Rev. 127, 143 (2008).   
 Nothing in Section 5 gives the FTC the power to set standards for the extremely 
complex computer software and hardware systems that businesses employ to ensure 
data security.  And no court has ever held that the “unfairness” prong of Section 5 gives 
the Commission the authority to regulate a private company’s data-security practices.  
Indeed, it is inconceivable that Congress would have delegated a policy choice of such 
significant political and economic consequence to the FTC through a statute that does 
no more than forbid “unfair” trade practices—“[Congress] does not, one might say, hide 
elephants in mouseholes.”  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 
(2001).  Confirming that intuition, Congress has enacted no less than 10 federal statutes 
prescribing specific data-security standards for elements of the private sector.  None 
grants the FTC the authority it claims here.   Those subsequent acts shape the meaning 
of Section 5 and confirm that the statute’s reference to “unfair” practices does not 
empower the FTC to oversee the data-security practices of private companies.  As 
recently put in the Wall Street Journal, “[u]sing consumer protection laws to address 
cyber vulnerabilities is stretching the FTC’s mission beyond recognition.”  Michael 
Chertoff, The Lesson of Google’s Safari Hack, Wall Street Journal (July 22, 2012), 
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 3  
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303933704577532
572854142492.html. 
 Indeed, the FTC’s approach to data-security regulation in this very case only 
confirms that the Commission has neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to 
establish data-security standards for the private sector.  The FTC has not published any 
rules or regulations that might provide the business community with ex ante notice of 
what data-security protections a company must employ to be in compliance with the 
law.  See Scott, 60 Admin. L. Rev. at 143-144 (there are no “rulemaking proceedings, 
policy statements or guidelines from the Commission explaining what conduct … it 
deems ‘unreasonable,’ and hence actionable”).  Instead, the FTC is enforcing its vision 
of data-security policy through this selective, ex post enforcement action, which seeks 
to hold WHR liable without any fair notice as to what the law required.  Moreover, after 
a two-year investigation into WHR’s data-security practices, the FTC is still unable to 
allege anything more specific than that WHR failed to employ protections that were 
“reasonable,” “appropriate,” “adequate,” or “proper.”  The FTC’s inability or 
unwillingness to state precisely what WHR did wrong—or to tell others in the business 
community what they must do to avoid similar lawsuits in the future—confirms that the 
Commission has no business trying to regulate data-security practices under the 
“unfairness” prong of the FTC Act. 
 The implications of the FTC’s legal theories in this case are far-reaching.  
American businesses already face a dizzying array of specific federal statutes regarding 
data security—but WHR is not alleged to have violated any of those specific statutes.  
Instead, despite having previously conceded that it lacks authority to regulate data 
security, the FTC is now seeking judicial approval to extend its statutory power beyond 
what Congress has allowed and into highly technical areas where the FTC has no 
regulatory expertise.  The FTC’s approach would subject businesses to vague, 
unpublished, and uncertain requirements that would drastically alter the competitive 
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 4  
landscape—without Congress or the President actually settling the debate about the 
costs and benefits of data security for American businesses. 
BACKGROUND 
 WHR is a hospitality company that provides services to hotels operating under 
the “Wyndham Hotels” brand name (the “Wyndham-branded hotels”), a full-service 
hotel chain with over 70 locations in the United States.  Am. Compl. ¶ 9.  With few 
exceptions, each Wyndham-branded hotel is independently owned by a third party 
unaffiliated with WHR or the other defendants.  Id.  Most of those independent owners 
are authorized to use the “Wyndham Hotels” brand name pursuant to franchise 
agreements with WHR, through which WHR licenses the use of the brand name and 
agrees to provide services to the franchisee, who retains day-to-day responsibility for 
the hotel.  Id.  Other independent owners entered into management agreements with 
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc. (“WHM”).  Id. ¶ 10. 
 WHR maintains and operates a computer network that it uses to provide services 
to the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. ¶ 16.  Each Wyndham-branded hotel maintains 
and operates its own computer network that is separate from, but linked to, WHR’s 
network.  Id. ¶ 15.  On three occasions from 2008 to 2010, criminal hackers gained 
unauthorized access into WHR’s computer network and into the separate computer 
networks of several Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. ¶ 25.  The intrusions into the 
Wyndham-branded hotels’ networks may have resulted in the hackers stealing payment 
card data that the independent hotel owners had collected from their guests.  Id.  
Significantly, the FTC does not allege that the hackers stole (or even had access to) any 
payment card data collected by WHR. 
 The FTC alleges that WHR violated Section 5 of the FTC Act—which forbids 
“unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,” 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)—
by not maintaining “reasonable and appropriate” data-security protections.  Am. Compl. 
¶ 1.  Although no court has ever construed Section 5 to apply to a private company’s 
data-security practices, the FTC advances two legal theories for its novel construction 
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 5  
of the Act.  Count I relies on Section 5’s prohibition on “decepti[ve]” practices and 
alleges that WHR deceived consumers by stating on its website that it used 
“commercially reasonable efforts” to secure payment card data that it collected.  Id. ¶¶ 
21, 44-46.  Count II, in contrast, alleges that WHR’s data-security protections amounted 
to “unfair” trade practices under Section 5 because those practices were not “reasonable 
and appropriate.”  Id. ¶¶ 47-49. 
ARGUMENT 
 This case is a classic example of agency overreaching. The FTC’s Count II 
“unfairness” claim—which this brief addresses first—stretches far beyond the 
traditional bounds of the Commission’s authority.  Nothing in the text or history of 
Section 5 purports to give the Commission authority to decide whether data-security 
protections are “unfair,” “reasonable,” or “appropriate,” and Congress’s repeated 
enactment of specific data-security statutes (and failed attempts to enact comprehensive 
data-security laws) confirm that the statute cannot be construed so broadly.  Simply put, 
Section 5’s prohibition on “unfair” trade practices does not give the FTC authority to 
regulate the data-security practices of private companies. 
 Although more securely grounded in the requirements of the statute, the FTC’s 
Count I “deception” claim—which relies exclusively on certain statements in WHR’s 
online privacy policy—must also be dismissed.  As alleged, the only information 
compromised during the criminal cyber attacks was certain payment card data collected 
by independent Wyndham-branded hotels—no data collected by WHR was ever placed 
at risk.  Numerous sections of the privacy policy make abundantly clear that WHR 
made no representations at all about the security of data collected by the independent 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  And to the extent the FTC purports to allege that WHR’s 
representations regarding its own data-security practices were deceptive, those 
allegations fall well short of the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). 
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 6  
I. THE COUNT II UNFAIRNESS CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
A. The FTC’s Unfairness Authority Does Not Extend To Data Security 
“Regardless of how serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to 
address, … it may not exercise its authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
administrative structure that Congress enacted into law.”  FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000) (quotation marks omitted).  That perfectly 
describes the FTC’s complaint in this case.  In delegating to the FTC authority to 
regulate “unfair …. acts or practices,” Congress clearly did not authorize the FTC to 
regulate anything and everything that the Commission might deem “unfair.”  To the 
contrary, the reach of the FTC’s authority is necessarily limited by Section 5’s text, 
history, and “place in the overall statutory scheme.”  Id. at 133. 
Nothing in the plain text of Section 5 suggests that Congress gave the FTC 
authority to regulate data security, which is itself strong evidence that no such authority 
exists.  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (“[Congress] does not alter the fundamental details of 
a regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions.”).  Section 5’s legislative 
history also confirms that no such delegation was intended.  Since its enactment in 
1914, Section 5 has consistently been understood to give the FTC power to forbid 
certain “unfair” practices; but in enacting Section 5, Congress also thought the FTC 
would “have no power to prescribe the methods of competition to be used in the 
future.”  51 Cong. Rec. 14932 (1914) (emphasis added); see also FTC v. Sinclair Ref. 
Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475 (1923) (“[The FTC] has no general authority to compel 
competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or to 
prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in … competition.”). 
Indeed, until quite recently, the FTC specifically disclaimed the authority to 
mandate data-security standards through Section 5’s “unfair … practices” language.  In 
a 2000 report on information security, the FTC requested broader legislation requiring 
websites to “take reasonable steps to protect the security of the information they collect 
from consumers” and “provid[ing] an implementing agency with the authority to 
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 7  
promulgate more detailed standards pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.”  
FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, May 
2000, at 36-37, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.  
Such legislation was necessary, the Report concluded, because “the Commission lacks 
authority to require firms to adopt information practice policies.”  Id. at 34 (emphasis 
added); see also Scott, 60 Admin. L. Rev. at 130-31 (“In its 2000 Report, the 
Commission indicated that … it could not require companies to adopt privacy policies 
[and] proposed legislation that would provide it with the authority to issue and enforce 
specific privacy regulations.”).1  Since that time, the FTC has made an about-face: now 
the Commission says that its jurisdiction over “unfair” practices does give it authority 
to mandate that companies adopt certain data-security practices. 
The FTC’s initial view reflected the correct understanding of Congressional 
intent.  As the Supreme Court has explained, subsequently enacted laws “shape or focus 
[the] meaning[]” of ambiguous statutes, “particularly … where the scope of the earlier 
statute is broad but the subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at hand.”  
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143.  Here, the vast array of more-specific laws 
governing data security preclude an interpretation of Section 5 that would grant the 
FTC jurisdiction to regulate data-security practices.  For example: 
· The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1953, 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., imposes requirements for the collection, 
disclosure, and disposal of data collected by consumer reporting agencies and 
requires the FTC and other agencies to develop rules for financial institutions to 
reduce the incidence of identity theft. 
 
· The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 et seq., mandates data-security requirements for 
financial institutions, and instructs the FTC and federal banking agencies to 
                                                 
1 Other FTC officials have echoed the view that the Commission lacks authority to 
require private companies to implement certain data-security protections.  See Jeffrey 
Benner, FTC Powerless to Protect Privacy, Wired, May 31, 2001, available at 
www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2001/05/44173 (“But according to FTC, it 
doesn’t have that kind of power.  The agency can order a company to make its stated 
policy align with practice, but it cannot dictate what those practices will be, or prevent 
it from changing a policy.  ‘The agency’s jurisdiction is (over) deception,’ Lee Peeler, 
the FTC’s associate director for advertising practices, said.  ‘If a practice isn’t 
deceptive, we can’t prohibit them from collecting information.  The agency doesn’t 
have the jurisdiction to enforce privacy.’”). 
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 8  
establish standards for financial institutions “to protect against unauthorized access 
to or use of such records or information.”  15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(3). 
 
· The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), Pub. L. 105-277, 112 
Stat. 2581-728, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq., requires covered website 
operators to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the 
confidentiality and security of information gathered from children. 
 
· The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., requires health care 
providers to maintain security standards for electronic health information. 
 
· The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(“HITECH Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17921 
et seq., requires regulated entities to provide notice of unsecured breaches of health 
information in certain circumstances and strengthens protections for such data. 
 
· The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
385, 106 Stat. 1460, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 551, requires cable companies to take 
steps to prevent unauthorized access to the certain subscriber information.2 
 Significantly, several of these laws, including the FCRA, GLBA, and COPPA, 
grant the FTC authority to regulate data-security standards—but only in certain specific, 
limited contexts.  Those statutes are powerful evidence that the FTC lacks authority to 
regulate data-security practices in cases (like this one) that fall outside the confines of 
those narrow delegations.  Indeed, if Section 5’s prohibition on “unfair” practices grants 
the FTC the broad authority it claims in this case, then those statutes would have been 
entirely superfluous.  By delegating certain limited authority to the FTC, Congress has 
foreclosed any interpretation of Section 5 that would give the Commission overarching 
authority to set data-security standards for the private sector. 
 Courts, moreover, “must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the 
manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and 
political magnitude to an administrative agency.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
133.  Establishing substantive data-security standards for private companies has been a 
topic of intense debate among members of Congress, the Executive Branch, interest 
groups, and relevant stakeholders.  No less than eight data-security bills were 
                                                 
2 These laws are only the tip of the iceberg.  See also, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, 
Pub. L. 100-618 (1988); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322;  
Computer Fraud Abuse Act of 1986, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. 
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 9  
introduced in 2011 alone,3 including bills that would have expressly given the FTC the 
very power that it claims in this litigation.  None was enacted.  More recently, in a very 
high-profile and well-publicized debate, Congress considered (and rejected) the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2012), which would have 
created comprehensive “cybersecurity performance requirements” for the private sector.  
Id. § 104.   In light of the important economic and political considerations involved in 
establishing data-security standards for the private sector, and the intense political 
debate that has surrounded efforts to establish such standards, it offends common sense 
to think that Congress would have delegated that responsibility to the FTC—
particularly through a century-old statute that does nothing more than forbid “unfair” 
practices.  “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such economic 
and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”  Brown & Williamson, 
529 U.S. at 160; see Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (rejecting the “idea 
that Congress gave the Attorney General such broad and unusual authority through an 
implicit delegation”); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (stating that it is “implausible that 
Congress would give to the EPA through … modest words the power to determine 
whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards”). 
 Nor is it conceivable that Congress, through implication, would have delegated 
the task of mandating affirmative data-security requirements to the FTC—an agency 
that has no particular expertise in either the policy or technology of data-security issues.  
Congress delegates legislative authority primarily to harness the “relative expertness” 
that a specialized agency can bring to bear on a subject matter.  United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 228 (2001).  The FTC’s expertise, however, is in evaluating fair 
competition and consumer fraud and deception—not in establishing and enforcing 
                                                 
3See Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2011, S. 1151; Data Security and 
Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 1207; Data Breach Notification Act of 2011, S. 
1408; Data Security Act of 2011, S. 1434; Personal Data Protection and Breach 
Accountability Act of 2011, S. 1535; Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 1707 
(2011); Data Accountability and Trust Act of 2011, H.R. 1841; Secure and Fortify 
Electronic Data Act, H.R. 2577 (2011). 
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 10  
cybersecurity standards for the private sector.  For proof of that, the Court need look no 
further than the FTC’s Amended Complaint in this case.  After a two-year investigation 
into WHR’s data-security practices, the FTC is unable to allege anything more specific 
than that WHR failed to employ practices that were “reasonable,” “appropriate,” 
“adequate,” or “proper.”  If an agency can provide no more guidance than that, then it 
has no business attempting to regulate data-security practices in the first-place.  There 
is, in short, little reason to think that Congress would have wanted the FTC to play such 
a critical role in an area so far afield from its core competencies. 
In the end, this case is analogous to Brown & Williamson, in which the Supreme 
Court rejected the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products under the Federal Drug 
and Cosmetics Act because Congress had subsequently enacted tobacco-specific 
legislation.  529 U.S. 120.  As in Brown & Williamson, “Congress has enacted several 
statutes addressing the particular subject of [data security]” and has done so “against the 
background” of the FTC asserting that it “lacks jurisdiction” to mandate data-security 
practices.  Id. at 155-56.  “Under these circumstances, it is clear that Congress’ [data-
security-specific] legislation has effectively ratified the [FTC’s] previous position that it 
lacks jurisdiction to regulate [data security].”  Id. at 156.  
B. Even Assuming the FTC Could Regulate Data Security, Any Such 
Requirements Would Have To Be Established Through Rulemaking. 
 For these reasons, Section 5 does not give the FTC authority to mandate data-
security standards for the private sector.  But even if it did, the FTC would have to 
establish data-security standards ex ante through rulemaking, rather than ex post 
through a selective enforcement action. 
 Although agencies have some discretion to make law through the adjudicative 
process, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have recognized important limits on 
that discretion that stem from fundamental notions of fair notice and due process.  Thus, 
when an agency tries to use an adjudication to announce new principles of law that 
could have widespread application, the agency has abused its authority by forgoing ex 
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ante rulemaking in favor of ex post adjudication.  See Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 673 F.2d 
1008 (9th Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).  In Ford 
Motor Co., for example, the Ninth Circuit invalidated the FTC’s attempt to use an 
adjudication to announce for the first time that a dealership’s practice of repossessing 
cars could violate Section 5.  The FTC’s adjudication, the court held, (1) established 
new law without notice, as it was “the first [relevant] agency action against a dealer,” 
and (2) had “general application” because “practices similar to those [found unlawful] 
[were] widespread in the car dealership industry,” Ford Motor Co., 673 F.2d. at 1010.   
If the FTC was going to regulate in that area at all, it had to do so through rulemaking. 
 The same is true in this case.  If the Court were to hold that the FTC has 
authority to mandate data-security standards for the private sector under Section 5, that 
holding would amount to a clear departure from existing law.  And that departure would 
have widespread application: every U.S. business that collects data from consumers 
would be required to implement what the FTC mandates.  Thus, even if Section 5 could 
be construed to give the FTC authority over data-security practices, the FTC would be 
obligated to exercise that authority through rulemaking, not through adjudication.  See 
id.; Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 Indeed, permitting the FTC to impose general data-security standards on WHR 
in this case would raise serious constitutional questions of fair notice and due process.  
It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law that a defendant must be given fair notice 
of what the law requires before it can be held liable for its violation.  See United States 
v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996); see also General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 
F.3d 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  Section 5 by itself clearly provides no notice as to what 
data-security practices a company must adopt to be in compliance with the statute.  And 
the FTC has not issued any rules, regulations, or other guidance that would provide 
such notice.  In the absence of any affirmative guidance as to what Section 5 requires in 
the world of data security, WHR cannot reasonably (or constitutionally) be found to 
have violated any of the FTC’s post-hoc data-security standards. 
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C. Section 5 Does Not Govern The Security of Payment Card Data 
Even if Section 5 could be construed to give the FTC authority over some 
aspects of data security, the statute clearly cannot be stretched so far as to authorize the 
FTC to regulate the security of consumer payment card data.  Under the statute, a 
practice can be found unfair only if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves.”  15 U.S.C. § 
45(n) (emphasis added).  But, because of the special nature of payment card data, 
consumer injury from the theft of such data is always avoidable and never substantial.  
Federal law places a $50 limit on the amount for which a consumer can be liable for the 
unauthorized use of a payment card.  See Id. § 1643(a)(1)(B).  And all major card 
brands have adopted policies that waive liability for even that small amount.4  Thus 
consumers can always “reasonably avoid” any financial injury stemming from the theft 
of payment card data simply by having their issuer rescind any unauthorized charges. 
Indeed, at least one FTC Commissioner has taken the view that the FTC cannot 
use its “unfairness” authority to regulate most data-security practices because the 
consumer harm involved is “intangible.”  See Dissenting Statement of J. Thomas 
Rosch, Protective Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, at C-4 (March 26, 
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. As 
Commissioner Rosch explained, use of the FTC’s “unfairness” authority in that fashion 
“goes well beyond what the Commission said in the early 1980s that it would do, and 
well beyond what Congress has permitted the Commission to do under Section 5(n).”  
                                                 
4 See Visa, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/zero_liability.
html (“zero liability” for unauthorized card use); MasterCard, http://www.
mastercard.us/zero-liability.html (same); Discover, http://www.discovercard.com/
customer-service/fraud/protect-yourself.html (same); American Express, https://
www212.americanexpress.com/dsmlive/dsm/dom/us/en/fraudprotectioncenter/fraudprot
ectioncenter_purchaseprotection.do?vgnextoid126e0918a025c110VgnVCM200000d0fa
ad94RCRD&vgnextchannel=9ee6d6954360c110VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD&app
instancename=default (same) (all last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
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Id. at C-5.  Adhering to that view, Commissioner Rosch dissented from the FTC’s 
decision to include an “unfairness” claim in its complaint in this case.5 
Even if Section 5 could be construed to mandate certain data-security 
requirements for payment card data, the standard of liability for failing to protect that 
data would be demanding and far above what the FTC has alleged in this case.  By 
statutory command, the requirements imposed by Section 5 must be balanced against 
the risk of consumer injury.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  And because the risk of consumer 
injury posed by the theft of payment card data is either non-existent or, at a minimum, 
exceedingly small, the standard of liability for failing to adequately protect such data 
would have to be correspondingly high.  That is precisely why courts examining data-
security issues under state unfair-trade-practices statutes have held that such practices 
are unfair only when they are egregious or “reckless” in nature.  See, e.g., Worix v. 
MedAssets, Inc., 2012 WL 1419257, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2012).  The FTC, of 
course, does not allege such recklessness or egregiousness here. 
 As support for its novel theory of Section 5’s “unfairness” authority, the FTC is 
likely to rely on FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010).  That case, however, 
is of no help to the FTC here.  Neovi involved a website—Qchex.com—that provided 
software allowing registered users to electronically draw checks from their bank 
account and to transmit those checks to third parties.  The website quickly became a 
tool for “con artists and fraudsters.”  Id. at 1154.  Having stolen names and bank 
account information via other means, these fraudsters would open accounts on 
Qchex.com and draw funds from bank accounts that they did not own.  Id.  Because it 
“facilitated and provided substantial assistance” to those fraudulent activities, id. at 
1156, Oxchex was found liable under the FTC Act. 
 The FTC’s theory of liability here is much different.  Neovi, to begin, was not a 
data-security case: Qchex was liable not because it failed to secure sensitive consumer 
                                                 
5 See FTC Press Release, FTC Files Complaint Against Wyndham Hotels (June 26, 
2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/06/wyndham.shtm. 
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data that it had collected (which is the FTC’s theory in this case), but because its 
software allowed fraudsters to exploit data that they previously had stolen from other 
entities.  The case thus cannot, and does not, support the FTC’s attempt to extend its 
unfairness jurisdiction to regulating data-security practices.  In addition, Neovi did not 
involve the use of payment card data, and thus the Ninth Circuit had no occasion to 
consider how and whether Section 5 should apply to security for such data.  Finally, 
Neovi presented exactly the kind of egregious conduct that traditionally has been the 
subject of Section 5 litigation.  In the website’s six-year existence, over 13,750 
fraudulent accounts were opened, nearly 155,000 fraudulent checks were issued, and 
more than $400 million in fraudulent funds were drawn from consumers’ accounts—an 
amount that was more than half of the total funds that were drawn using Qcheck.com.  
Id. at 1154.  That conduct cannot sensibly be compared to that of WHR in this case. 
D. The Unfairness Count Fails Federal Pleadings Requirements. 
 Finally, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed for the independent reason 
that it fails to satisfy basic federal-pleading requirements.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  The Amended Complaint criticizes WHR for failing to employ 
practices that were “readily available,” “adequate,” “commonly-used,” and “proper.” 
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24.  But nowhere does the FTC give any factual detail as to what 
procedures, or combination of procedures, would have met those conclusory standards.  
For example, the FTC alleges that defendants “failed to ensure the Wyndham-branded 
hotels implemented adequate information security policies,” id. ¶ 24(c), but never states 
what policies would be “adequate.”  It criticizes defendants’ operating systems as 
“outdated,” id. ¶ 24(d), but fails to allege what alternative systems would be current.  
And it states that defendants “failed to employ reasonable measures to detect and 
prevent unauthorized access,” id. ¶ 24(h), but does not explain what measures would be 
“reasonable”—now or when the alleged breaches occurred.  Simply put, the FTC’s 
allegations are nothing more than “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations” 
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and do not state a plausible claim for relief.  Worden v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 
2010 WL 2292943 (D. Ariz. June 8 2010). 
II. THE COUNT I DECEPTION CLAIM FAILS AS A MATTER OF LAW 
 The FTC’s Count I deception claim fares no better than its Count II unfairness 
claim.  To impose liability under the “deception” prong of Section 5, the FTC must 
identify (1) a representation; that (2) is “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably 
under the circumstances;” that (3) is “material.”  FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 
(9th Cir. 2009).  Because such a claim “sounds in fraud,” the FTC must meet the 
heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) when alleging unlawful deception.  FTC 
v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal. 2010); FTC v. Ivy Capital, 
Inc., 2011 WL 2118626, at *3 (D. Nev. May 25, 2011). 
 As the sole basis for its claim, the FTC alleges that WHR deceived consumers 
because its online privacy policy stated that it used “industry standard practices” and 
“commercially reasonable efforts” to secure the payment card data that it collected.  See 
Ex. 1, Allen Decl., Ex. A, at 1.6  Those statements were deceptive, the FTC claims, 
because WHR failed to implement “reasonable and appropriate measures” to protect the 
payment card data collected by the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Am. Compl. ¶ 45.  But 
there is a clear disconnect in those allegations—namely, the FTC fails to recognize the 
fundamental distinction between data collected by WHR itself (to which the privacy 
policy applies) and data collected by the  independently owned Wyndham branded 
hotels (to which the privacy policy expressly does not apply.) 
 WHR and the independently owned Wyndham-branded hotels each engage in 
their own separate data-collection and storage practices.  As a franchisor, WHR collects 
payment card data through its centralized reservations service—which permits guests to 
book hotel rooms either online or over the phone—and stores that information on its 
                                                 
6 “Consideration of materials incorporated by reference in the complaint is permitted 
when plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches 
the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of 
the document.”  Spinedex Physical Therapy USA, Inc. v. United Healthcare of Ariz., 
Inc., 661 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
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corporate network.  See Allen Decl., Ex. A, at 2.  In addition, and separate and apart 
from WHR’s practices, the independently owned hotels also collect payment card data 
and store that data on their local networks.  Id. at 4. 
 As the text of the WHR privacy policy makes abundantly clear, the policy 
applies only to the security of payment card data collected by WHR and does not 
purport to say anything at all about the security of payment card data collected by the 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  Thus, the privacy policy consistently uses the terms “we,” 
“us,” or “our” when making representations about WHR’s data-security practices, and 
specifically defines those terms to exclude the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. at 1.  The 
policy also expressly caveats each representation about data-security by explaining that 
those representations apply only to “our collection” of data and only “to the extent we 
control the Information”—caveats that plainly exclude any data collected by the 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id.  And if all of that were not enough, the privacy policy 
includes a separately-titled section—which the FTC conveniently omitted from its 
quotation of WHR’s privacy policy in the Amended Complaint—that explains the 
policy makes no representations about the security of data collected by franchisees: 
 
Our Franchisees. 
Each Brand hotel is owned and operated by an independent 
Franchisee that is neither owned nor controlled by us or our 
affiliates.  Each Franchisee collects Customer Information and 
uses the Information for its own purposes.  We do not control the 
use of this Information or access to the Information by the 
Franchisee and its associates.  The Franchisee is the merchant who 
collects and processes credit card information and receives 
payment for the hotel services.  The Franchisee is subject to the 
merchant rules of the credit card processors it selects, which 
establish its card security rules and procedures. 
Id. at 4.  Thus, evaluating the “net impression” of the privacy policy and construing the 
policy “as a whole,” FTC v. Connelly, 2006 WL 6267337, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 
2006), any reasonable consumer would have understood that the policy was making 
statements only about data collected by WHR, and not about the security of data 
collected by independently-owned Wyndham-branded hotels. 
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 That fact is fatal to the FTC’s deception claim.  The only basis on which the FTC 
attempts to show that the privacy policy was “likely to mislead consumers” is by 
pointing to three instances in which cybercriminals were able to access payment-card 
data collected and controlled by the independently owned hotels.  See Am Compl. ¶¶ 
25, 30-31, 34-35, 37.  But, as explained, the WHR privacy policy does not make any 
representations at all about the security of data collected by the Wyndham-branded 
hotels—indeed, the policy expressly disclaims making any such representations. 
 Perhaps recognizing this critical flaw in its argument, the FTC makes a half-
hearted attempt to allege that WHR did not adequately protect the data that WHR itself 
collected and stored.  But those allegations amount to nothing more than conclusory 
statements of wrongdoing that fall well short of establishing a “plausible” claim to 
relief.  Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  For example, although the Amended Complaint purports 
to list a series of alleged data-security deficiencies, the great majority of those relate 
only to the security of data collected by the Wyndham-branded hotels—which, as 
explained, the privacy policy says nothing at all about.  See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24(a)-(f).  
And those allegations which even arguably apply to WHR’s network all rely on 
unadorned legal conclusions that are completely devoid of any specific factual 
development.  Thus, although the Amended Complaint alleges that WHR did not 
employ certain “adequate[],” “reasonable,” or “proper” practices, id. ¶¶ 24(g)-(j), the 
FTC makes no attempt to explain what those terms mean or what it believes would have 
been “adequate[],” “reasonable,” or “proper” in those specific contexts.  And most 
telling of all: the FTC nowhere alleges that any intruder ever compromised (or even had 
access to) data collected by WHR.  That fact, coupled with the barebones nature of the 
FTC’s allegations concerning the security of data collected by WHR, conclusively 
undermines any argument that the WHR privacy policy was somehow “deceptive.” 
CONCLUSION 
 For all of these reasons, WHR respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the 
FTC’s complaint as a matter of law.  
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